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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
The aim of this study is to examine the Nomination Committee 
(NC) in Maltese listed companies. The study achieves this by 
assessing the Maltese regulatory framework relating  to this 
Committee, as well as its roles, status and effectiveness. A 
predominantly qualitative mixed methodology was employed to 
achieve these objectives. Twenty-five semi-structured interviews 
were held with two financial analysts, two MFSA representatives, 
eight audit firm representatives and 13 representatives of Maltese 
Listed Companies (MLCs) Research findings show that the NC is 
not as yet not well established among MLCs. There is a particular 
lack of insistence on the part of local regulatory authorities, as 
well as substantial resistance from listed companies, with regard 
to the adoption of this  committee. Furthermore, most NCs in 
such companies are not performing all of the roles listed in their 
Code while the roles currently performed may need to be carried 
out in a more structured manner. Yet it is highly worthwhile for 
such companies to devote more attention to the NC, this being 
one of the best possible bastions of appropriate corporate 
governance. The change in the status of the NC from being 
merely recommended by the Code of Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance to becoming mandatory by the Listing 
Rules is increasingly called  for. In this way, Maltese listed 
companies will need to embrace such a change. It is hoped  that 
this study will contribute towards fostering more awareness about 
the NC and the corporate governance of Maltese listed 
companies. 
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The board of directors (‘Board’) may delegate, totally or partially, various roles and responsibilities to 
its committees (Mallin, 2004). According to Kim, Nofsinger and Mohr (2010), a substantial amount of 
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Board work is carried out by these committees so as to improve efficiency in view of the more 
specialised nature of the committees. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the Nomination Committee (‘NC’) is studied in greater depth. The NC is 
a committee appointed by the Board to which it delegates the key responsibility of identifying 
candidates qualified for Board membership (Mallin, 2004). Such a committee ensures that director 
appointments are made on “merit rather than by patronage” (McKnight and Weir, 2009, p.143). 
 
In Malta, the appointment of the NC is included as a provision in the Code of Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance 2010 (‘Code’). The Code was issued by the Malta Financial Services Authority 
(‘MFSA’), and it lists the principles and provisions relating to good corporate governance (‘CG’). 
Along with the MFSA Listing Rules 2016, the Code recommends that Maltese listed companies 
(‘MLCs’) adopt such principles and provisions in order to contribute towards enhanced CG (MFSA, 
2016). 
 
The NC is the “bona fide working unit of the Board” (Murphy, 2008, p.147). However, despite its 
significance, the NC has been paid scant attention and has not been subject to ample research 
(Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012; EY, 2016). This study is therefore aimed at contributing towards 
bridging this literature gap, by assessing the Maltese regulatory framework relating to the NC, and the 
NC’s roles, status and effectiveness. The research is conducted in Malta, a small island state economy. 
The rest of this paper is divided into five main sections. The second section provides a summary of the 
relevant literature on the NC, followed by the third section which discusses the methodology 
employed in this study. The fourth section presents the findings, while the fifth section discusses such 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Maltese Regulatory Framework 
The Code stipulates that the company’s shareholders have the jurisdiction to appoint and  elect 
directors (MFSA, 2010). Similarly, the Companies Act requires that company directors, other than the 
first directors, are elected by the shareholders at the annual general meeting (AGM), unless otherwise 
indicated in the company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association. However, Bezzina, 
Baldacchino and Azzopardi (2014) found that a number of MLCs have a tendency to be dominated by 
an absolute controlling shareholder, who holds more than half the company’s shares in the aggregate. 
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In such companies, the controlling shareholder has the right to directly appoint directors to the Board, 
and to thus control most  of the Board’s composition. 
 
The Code recommends MLCs to appoint a NC to recommend director candidates to the  Board 
(MFSA, 2010). However, the appointment of the NC is still not mandatory as at the date of this study. 
Nevertheless, such a committee has been made mandatory for significant credit institutions and 
investment companies, pursuant to the issue of the Fourth Capital Requirement Directive and 
Regulation in June 2013. As from January 2014, each Member State was obliged to adopt the 
requirements set out by this regulation and to transpose this directive into national law (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2013). 
 
The Roles of the Nomination Committee 
A common misconception is that the role of the NC is simply to nominate director candidates (KPMG, 
2012). However, as recommended by the Code, the roles of the NC should also include the following: 
determining director independence and advising the Board regarding any issues that may affect 
director independence (KPMG, 2012); reviewing Board composition through an assessment of the 
size, composition and membership of the Board (Higgs, 2003); reviewing Board performance through 
annual self-evaluations (KPMG, 2012); considering succession planning via an assessment of the 
possible gaps in the skills and expertise of the Board and senior management (EY and ICSA, 2016); 
and selecting competent candidates to fulfil senior management positions and recommending them to 
the Board and chief executive officer (EY and ICSA, 2016). 
 
The Status of the Nomination Committee 
The roles of the NC tend to be less clearly defined than those of the Audit and the Remuneration 
committees, even though “it is arguably the most important of the three” (EY and ICSA, 2016, p.4). It 
has also been noted that “in recent years the NC has been portrayed as the poor relation of the main 
BCs” (EY and ICSA, 2016, p.4). In fact, the appointment of the NC has been much slower in 
comparison with the appointment of the Audit and Remuneration Committees (McKnight and Weir, 
2009). A probable cause for such a delay may be attributed to this lack of clarity regarding the roles of 
the NC (Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012). In addition, the NC has not been afforded the same 
amount of guidance as  the other BCs (EY and ICSA, 2016), and the attention provided to it “seems to 
have fallen off the radar” (KPMG, 2012, p.70). The CG codes of various jurisdictions particularly 
insist on the appointment of the Audit and Remuneration Committees, yet the NC receives much less 
attention. This lack of insistence may also be another cause for the delay in the appointment  of the NC 
(Higgs, 2003; Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012). However, Masulis (2012) argued that “forward-
looking corporations that are trying to maximise shareholder wealth should be in front of regulators, 
and should want to make the changes first”. 
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The appropriate size of the NC depends on its own remit, the size of the Board, and the availability of 
independent NEDs on the Board (KPMG, 2012). Such a committee should ideally comprise a 
minimum of three members (ICSA, 2013). However, according to EY and ICSA (2016), an apparent 
disadvantage of having the Board members constituting the NC is the potential lack of challenge, lack 
of scepticism and of questioning from such members. In addition, this requirement may also lead to 
common committee membership, which is greatly opposed by Higgs (2003). 
 
The Effectiveness of the Nomination Committee 
In view of the delegation of the various roles of the Board to the NC, the NC effectiveness will have 
an impact on the Board’s effectiveness (KPMG, 2012). In particular, an effective NC enhances the 
Board’s ability to discharge its roles (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In fact, Vafeas (1999) found that a 
Board with a NC will ultimately vary in effectiveness from one that does not have such a committee. 
This is because having a NC will benefit from group screening of the director candidates, potentially 
diminishing any limitations in the director nomination and appointment processes (Vafeas, 1999; 
Petra, 2005; Masulis, 2012). This renders an effective NC a key component for an equally effective 
Board. Furthermore, as stated by Higgs (2003), the increased use of the NC plays a pivotal role in 
raising the standards of CG, owing to the added assurance that the most significant roles of the Board 
are being effectively discharged. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A predominantly qualitative mixed methodology was implemented to achieve the objectives of this 
study. Data was collected through the use of 25 semi-structured interviews employing both closed-
ended and open-ended questions. These interviews were carried out with two financial analysts, two 
MFSA representatives, eight audit firm representatives and 13 MLC representatives.   Purposeful  
sampling  was  used,  whereby  the   researcher  selected    those participants with the ability of 
contributing, through their knowledge, to the various topics of this study. The interview schedule 
consisted of five sections. The first four sections elicited the interviewees’ views on the Maltese 
regulatory framework and the NC’s roles, status and effectiveness. The last section inquired about 
certain characteristics of the interviewees. 
 
The audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed shortly after the interviews were held, leading 
to the analysis and subsequent interpretation of the interviewees’ responses. The quantitative data 
collected from Likert-type items (with responses ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree 
scale) were analysed using IBM SPSS V22. To investigate differences in mean ranks across the Likert 
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scales, the Friedman test was used with paired samples while the Kruskal Wallis test was used with 
independent samples. In the presence of a significant effect, post-hoc tests were conducted. Due to 
word count limitations, only statistically significant findings (p<0.05). are being referred to in this 
paper. 
On the other hand, the qualitative data was analysed by summarising the transcripts, allowing key 





Nomination Committee in the Interviewee Companies 
Company interviewees (13/25) were asked whether or not their companies have an NC. Eight 
companies confirmed that they have a NC (‘NC-including interviewees’), while five do not have an 
NC (‘NC-excluding interviewees’). Most of the 13 companies interviewed (8/13) have a NC which is 
not standalone, having three independent NEDs and with a chairman who is also the chairman of the 
Board. Meetings are held at varying frequency, occurring up to once a month. All NCs have members 
who also hold positions in other BCs. 
 
The Maltese Regulatory Framework 
All interviewees maintained that the power to appoint and elect directors needs to remain vested solely 
in the shareholders. However, most of them (19/25) added that other parties,  which they specified, are 
best to be involved in recommending such appointments. The most mentioned parties include the NC 
(9/25) and the MFSA (6/25). Interestingly, six interviewees argued that no other parties should be 
involved. 
 
Almost all interviewees agreed (24/25) that Board members are generally biased when recommending 
new members to stand for election. They claimed that it is easier to recommend someone with whom 
one is acquainted and feels comfortable to work with, especially in a small state like Malta where 
people tend to know each other. Furthermore, interviewees identified the following barriers which 
may impair the engagement of the most suitable directors: bias of controlling shareholders towards 
persons of trust (7/25), shortage of competent individuals (6/25), inability of competent individuals to 
attract sufficient votes (5/25), inadequate remuneration (5/25), lack of interest (4/25) and insufficient 
time to devote to the  Board (4/25). 
 
Moreover, interviewees marginally agreed that an independent outside consultant should act as an 
advisor to the NC 3.60). Two agreeing interviewees (2/14) commented that the NC “has blank 
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authority to appoint advisors, as the Board members do not know everything”. Therefore, appointing 
outside advisors to assist the NC will render its work more effective. 
 
Interviewees expressed neutral views as to whether the appointment of the NC should be made 
mandatory by law 3.36). Six of the  agreeing interviewees  (6/14)  explained  that  the present ‘comply 
or explain’ Code provision is insufficient and tends to spur MLCs not to comply, but then to try to 
explain. On the other hand, six of the disagreeing interviewees (6/7) contended that imposition by law 
is not to be the way forward as each MLC has its own particular circumstances and it is best to leave it 
up to each company to decide whether or not to appoint an NC. 
 
Additional comments were requested specifically in relation to how justifiable it is that the NC has 
become mandatory only in the case of significant credit institutions and investment companies. The 
interviewees who commented favourably (17/25) to this maintained that both the operations and 
systemic importance of these companies are of such a magnitude that such discrimination is rendered 
justifiable. Conversely, the interviewees whose comments were unfavourable (8/25) stated that 
companies should be regulated in a uniform manner irrespective of their size, industry and whether 
they are listed or otherwise. 
 
Furthermore, interviewees disagreed with the statement that the recommendations of the NC are not to 
be circulated to the Board before being forwarded to the AGM  1.92). Furthermore, the responses to 
this statement (based on mean ranks) were significantly lower (p<0.01) from the preceding two 
statements. Most of the disagreeing interviewees (13/20) emphasised that the NC is a committee of the 
Board and thus the Board is ultimately responsible for such committee’s roles. 
 
The Roles of the Nomination Committee 
Interviewees strongly agreed with the role of the NC in reviewing Board composition             . 
They also agreed with three other NC roles: proposing director candidates to the Board (4.40), 
considering issues related to succession planning (4.28) and determining director independence      
(4.08).  However,  as  regards  the  last  two  roles,  interviewees  only marginally agreed that the NC 
should review the Board policy for the selection  and appointment of senior management and that the 
NC shall evaluate the Board performance  3.60). In fact, the interviewees’ responses for the latter two 
statements were statistically different (p<0.01) from those of the former four statements. 
 
When asked to comment about the roles which are currently performed by the NC in the companies of 
the NC-including interviewees, barely half of them (3/8) pointed out that their  NC actually performed 
the roles recommended to it by the Code. Moreover, when comparing the responses of the NC-
including interviewees regarding their agreement to the recommended NC roles with the actual roles 
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such a committee plays in their companies, it was found that overall, not all the recommended roles 
were in fact actually being taken up by the NC in many MLCs. This indicates an inconsistency 
between what the interviewees agreed with, and what actually happened in real life in the respective 
NCs. 
Furthermore, in the absence of the NC, NC-excluding interviewees commented that the parties 
responsible for the recommended roles usually assigned to the NC are mainly the shareholders, the 
Board and the chief executive officer. 
 
The Status of the Nomination Committee 
Interviewees expressed neutral views with respect to the statement that only members of the NC are to 
be permitted to attend the meetings of such committee 3.12). Two of the agreeing interviewees (2/13)  
explained that the other Board members are not to attend such meetings  as they might influence the 
decision/s taken by the NC members. Conversely, almost all disagreeing interviewees (9/12) stated 
that other Board members may be invited to attend for specific meetings, at the NC chairman’s 
discretion, to observe (without having a right to  vote), and thus contribute with their knowledge and 
experience. 
 
Interviewees also expressed mixed views as to whether the NC may successfully be  combined with 
another committee 3.08). Two of those who agreed (2/12) with this possibility stated that when 
nominating directors to the Board, remuneration needs to be taken into account, thus implying that it 
makes sense for the NC to be combined with the Remuneration Committee. In fact, most of the 
companies of the NC-including interviewees (5/8) have a combined NC-Remuneration Committee. 
However, three disagreeing interviewees (3/8) argued that it is best for the NC to be a separate 
committee because each committee has its own specific roles and focus. 
 
Furthermore, interviewees were marginally neutral tending to disagree with the statement that the 
members of the NC are not to be members of other committees 2.68). Six of these interviewees (6/13) 
commented that common committee membership is inevitable, especially when the Board is small and 
the company has quite a number of committees in existence. In fact, such common membership has 
been seen to be the case in the MLCs of the interviewed companies. 
 
Interviewees mostly disagreed with the statement that the NC does not deserve the same amount of 
attention and guidance as other committees 2.24) with ratings to this statement differing significantly 
between interviewees (p=0.04). Seven of these interviewees (7/17) emphasised that the NC plays a 
crucial role in proposing candidates for Board and senior management positions, which parties are 
responsible for the direction of the company; also that, given such importance, the NC should deserve 
the same amount of attention and guidance as other committees. 
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Furthermore, NC-including interviewees were asked whether another independent NED would be 
more appropriate to chair the NC than the chairman of the Board. Most of them (6/8) disagreed, 
adding that the chairman of the Board is more than capable of chairing the NC as well. In fact, most of 
the NCs in the companies of the NC-including interviewees (5/8) are chaired by the chairman of the 
Board. Conversely, the other interviewees (2/8) agreed, stating that if the same chairman chairs both 
the Board and the NC, then such chairman is more  likely to unduly influence the final decision. 
 
NC-including interviewees were also asked whether the report of the NC in the annual report provides 
enough assurance to the users that relevant issues are being addressed. Some (3/8) maintained that 
such a report is quite transparent, however others (2/8) stated that the disclosures on the work 
performed by the NC in the annual report are quite limited in view of the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of such work. 
In addition, all interviewees agreed that the setting up of the NC is relatively delayed owing  to various 
barriers. The following barriers were identified by interviewees: the appointment of the NC not yet 
being mandatory by law (10/25), the lack of awareness by MLCs of the use and importance of the NC 
(8/25), the appointment of the Audit Committee being given precedence (3/25), the fact that 
controlling shareholders are commonly not very willing to promote such a committee (2/25), the 
reluctance by the Board to delegate the responsibility of nominating directors to the NC (2/25) and the 
perception that such a committee might be “too much of a burden” (1/25). 
 
The Effectiveness of the Nomination Committee 
Interviewees were neutral as to whether the NC reduces the likelihood of appointing new directors 
based on personal connections . A few  of  them  (4/19)  remarked  that  the  appointment of the NC 
made up of independent members would convey a more transparent and objective view and ensure 
that they are not biased for improper reasons when nominating directors to the Board. 
 
Interviewees were also marginally neutral as to whether that the Board having the NC will ultimately 
differ in effectiveness from one not having such a committee. A few of them (3/19) emphasised that 
having a dedicated committee entrusted to actively filter and nominate the most suitable directors and 
to ensure that there is appropriate synergy around the table would contribute to the Board’s 
effectiveness. Moreover, they added that a NC composed of independent NEDs would result in more 
objectivity, independence and less bias in the execution of its roles, thus enhancing the effectiveness 
of the Board. 
However, interviewees expressed mixed views with respect to whether the Board can effectively 
perform the roles of the NC and therefore replace the NC 2.96). A few of the agreeing interviewees 
(4/10) commented that disagreeing with this statement would in effect be implying a lack of 
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confidence in the Boards of most companies in Malta to perform these roles, given that in practice, 
such companies did not have an NC. A further four interviewees commented that since there are no 
legal distinctions between the duties and liabilities of executives and NEDs, and since the NC is 
composed of Board members, then its roles may effectively be replaced by the main Board. On the 
other hand, most of the disagreeing interviewees (7/10) argued that the NC is composed of 
independent members having the required qualities, has fewer roles than the Board, and may therefore 
focus more effectively on performing such roles. 
 
Overall, it was found that a common viewpoint of the interviewees was that in order for the NC to 
reduce Board bias, enhance Board effectiveness and enhance CG, such a committee needs to be 
composed of independent outside consultants. 
 
In addition, interviewees specified the following benefits of appointing a NC: greater scrutiny of 
candidates for directorship positions (10/24), a more transparent director nomination process (7/24) 
(since the NC is composed of independent members), more time for the NC to conduct  an effective 
discussion (6/24), a higher probability of reaching consensus given that the NC has fewer members 
than the main Board (5/24), a more dedicated focus on the director nomination process (5/24), the 
possibility of benefitting from external independent perspectives (4/24), and the additional comfort 
provided to the shareholders arising from the fact that the recommendations of the Board would have 
been substantiated by the NC (2/24). 
 
On the other hand, interviewees also identified the following limitations: limited scope of a NC in 
MLCs having controlling shareholders with the right to appoint the majority of the directors (7/20), the 
lack of experience of Board members with regard to the operations of the NC (6/20), the limited 
available pool of independent NEDs given Malta’s small size (5/20) and  the possibility of conflicts of 




Who Needs to Be Involved in the Engagement of Directors? 
In Malta, the power of appointing and electing directors is conferred on the shareholders of the 
company, pursuant to the Code and the Companies Act. However, as also stated by most interviewees, 
other parties may be involved to provide guidance to the shareholders in appointing the most suitable 
and competent directors. These parties mainly include the NC and the Board. The positive input that 
such parties can contribute arises from the fact that  they hold a position that makes them most 
cognisant of the needs of the company. As a result of this, they are able to properly guide shareholders 
in appointing the most suitable directors. 
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In addition, independent outside consultants are also to be involved since, owing to their 
independence, they are in a better position to guide the shareholders in appointing the most competent 
directors. One suggestion that was mooted by one interviewee was to go a step further and even 
involve the company’s creditors and employees in the appointment of directors on the basis that they 
too have an interest to appoint the most suitable directors to ensure the continued smooth running of 
the company. Nonetheless, owing to the tendency for most MLCs to be dominated by controlling 
shareholders (Bezzina, Baldacchino and Azzopardi, 2014), the controlling shareholders would wish to 
retain the power to appoint directors, and would therefore be reluctant to permit any interference from 
other parties in  this regard. In particular, controlling shareholders are biased towards their  persons of 
trust and might want to appoint Board directors who they are confident will ensure that the 
shareholders’ interests are promoted and pursued. This may occur irrespective of whether or not such 
directors are competent enough to give a fair contribution to all the stakeholders of the company. 
 
The possibility of such resistance from the controlling shareholders renders the role of the MFSA, as 
the regulator, much more significant. The MFSA requires candidates to undergo a due diligence 
process so that it may establish whether they are ‘fit and proper’. Therefore, as emphasised by an 
MFSA representative, “irrespective of whom the shareholders would like  to appoint, if any candidate 
is not deemed ‘fit and proper’ by the regulator, then such candidate will in any case not be appointed ” 
However, this does not mean that the Board may rely on the checks being placed by the MFSA. The 
responsibility of the Board should probably extend towards the appointment of the appropriate 
directors in the first place, if  there is to be a proper first line of defence with regard to CG. 
 
Should the Nomination Committee Be Made Mandatory? 
With the NC not being mandatory, in their annual report most companies tend to neither comply nor 
explain sufficiently and reasonably the reasons for their non-compliance. Boards may be using 
different tactics – such as delaying or dominating ones – to retain their say about who will ultimately 
be appointed. Given such resistance, it is also not surprising that only eight of the 22 MLCs have a NC 
as at the date of this study. This is in line with the findings of Muscat (2012), Bezzina, Baldacchino 
and Azzopardi (2014), as well as Deguara (2014), all of which confirmed that the appointment of the 
NC was still not common practice among most MLCs as at the date of their studies. Therefore, within 
this context, more vigilance needs to be exercised by the regulator. On the one hand, this committee 
may not need to be enforced on MLCs. In line with Masulis (2012) and some of the interviewees’ 
responses, companies should not wait on the regulators to enforce the appointment of the NC on them; 
instead, they should adopt a more pro-active approach and voluntarily set it up. On the other hand, if 
the objective is to have more companies appoint a NC over the short term, the NC is best made 
mandatory by law, possibly in the Listing Rules in the same manner as the Audit Committee. 




To Whom Should the Nomination Committee Report? 
In line with most interviewee responses and Prasad (2011), the Board should retain responsibility for 
and make the final decisions relating to the roles delegated to the NC. Therefore, the recommendations 
of the NC are to be approved by the Board before being forwarded to the AGM. Nevertheless, as the 
owners of the company, shareholders constitute the party that is most interested in the Board 
composition and any recommendations related  to it. Thus, the question arises as to whether the NC 
should be empowered to report directly  to the shareholders at the AGM. This would avoid the 
possibility of any NC recommendations being rejected by the Board which, on their part, shareholders 
could find valid. With such direct reporting, it will be up to the shareholders to decide whether or not 
to accept the recommendations of the NC, without any material influence on such a decision by the 
members of the Board. While it remains questionable whether the Board would be ready to accept that 
it is bypassed in such an important decision, it is probable that such an arrangement would do away 
with undue Board politics. 
 
Are the Recommended Roles Sufficient? 
According to the majority of the interviewees, the roles designated for the NC as required by the Code 
are quite sufficient, particularly for those NCs which are operating effectively. The Board need not 
delegate more roles to it because, as also remarked by an interviewee, “this would overburden such 
committee and render more difficult the fulfilment of its roles ” 
 
Do Companies Practise What They Preach? 
For most of the recommended NC roles, it was difficult for the NC-including interviewees to practise 
what they preach within their NC. The indications are that a high level of resistance relates to the role 
of the NC to evaluate Board performance. Perhaps such apparent resistance to the evaluation of Board 
performance emanates from the idea that each of the existing Board members is to be assessed directly 
by the other Board members. Therefore, in line with Barlow (2016), the role of an independent outside 
consultant to help the NC in such evaluations might prove to be particularly important. Such outside 
views may help ensure  that the appropriate picture is drawn of each director, irrespective of their 
acceptance or otherwise within the Board. Surprisingly, the NC in most MLCs rarely has a role in  
proposing director candidates to the Board, even though their representatives agreed to it and 
identified it as being “its key role”. This is because, as most of the NC-including  interviewees 
explained, most directors are directly nominated and appointed by the controlling shareholders, and 
that therefore the NC has a limited role in such nominations. 
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Moreover, with regard to the other recommended roles of the NC, particularly the review of Board 
composition, these may need to be carried out in a more structured manner than at present. For 
example, the use of a ‘board skills matrix’ as explained by Clune, Hermanson, Tompkins and Ye 
(2014), which none of the interviewees actually referred to, would  probably help ensure a more 
thorough review than that being performed at present, which too often is performed in a very 
unstructured manner. 
Furthermore, as stated in the findings, in the absence of a NC, the parties responsible for such roles are 
the Board, the chief executive officer and the shareholders. However, all parties would probably be 
unable to supplant the NC roles successfully in view of insufficient focus and lack of specialisation. A 
properly structured NC with skilled NEDs should go a long way to fulfil such roles. 
 
What About Combining the Nomination Committee? 
From the findings of this study, it emerged that most NCs in Malta are combined with the 
Remuneration Committee. As indicated by Higgs (2003) and some interviewees’ responses,  in order 
to be in a position to propose director candidates to the Board, the NC requires feedback from the 
Remuneration Committee to enlighten it about the remuneration of such candidates once these have 
been appointed to the Board. This is because the NC needs to be assured that the minimum level of 
director remuneration is sufficient to be attractive to the right calibre of candidates with the 
appropriate qualifications and experience. Nevertheless, as also indicated by the interviewees and 
Higgs (2003), such a link does not mean that the NC has to be combined with the Remuneration 
Committee. Both committees have separate and distinct roles to fulfil, and combining them would 
probably give rise to the disadvantage of overburdening those directors involved in these committees. 
 
How Wise is Common Committee Membership? 
One problem of BCs is perceived to lie in the fact that most Boards appoint the same  directors on 
such committees (KPMG, 2012). This is in line with most of the interviewees’ responses, who claimed 
that common committee membership is inevitable owing to the size of the Board and the numerous 
BCs. In fact, it was found that common committee membership is the case for the Boards of all MLCs 
included in this study. Directors who are highly involved in such committees may be overloaded, 
leading to a lack of balance in Board deliberations. Therefore, while for the sake of cooperation and 
continuity, links may need to be maintained, on the other hand, indulging in too many committees 
would probably turn out to be detrimental to the CG of the company. 
 
Is the Board Chairman to Chair the Nomination Committee? 
As stated by most of the NC-including interviewees, the chairman of the Board may be sufficiently 
competent to also chair the NC. In fact, it was found to be common practice for most NCs in MLCs to 
be chaired by the Board chairman. However, normally it is considered best practice for both positions 
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to be segregated. This would ensure that the Board chairman, who is also typically the most powerful 
Board member, does not treat Board and NC matters as one and the same. Additionally, it ensures that 
the NC is composed of members who are most detached from the Board. 
 
What Constitutes the Nomination Committee Report? 
In line with EY and ICSA (2016) and interviewees’ responses, it may be the case that the report of the 
NC contained in the company’s annual report is not adequately transparent, owing to the sensitivity of 
the matters discussed by such committee and the general lack of regulation relating to it. While it may 
be clear that in view of such sensitivity involved, transparency at shareholder level is not always 
attainable, the NC may attempt to compensate for this by lodging regular reports – including the more 
confidential matters – to the Board. These may be further supported by the written viewpoints of 
independent outside advisors. 
 
What Barriers Hinder the Nomination Committee Appointment? 
McKnight and Weir (2009), as well as Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye (2012), maintained that the lack 
of awareness on the scope and benefits of the NC has resulted in the slower rate of the setting up of the 
NC. This has also been found to be the case in Malta. Furthermore, as also pointed out by the 
interviewees, the Audit Committee is given much more importance than the NC, even though as 
argued by EY and ICSA (2016), the NC is considered more important than the Audit and the 
Remuneration committees in view of the roles assigned to it. This  is  indicative,  therefore,  of  the  
need  to  make  the  NC  mandatory.  Interviewees also pointed out that a small Board commonly bars 
the appointment of the NC. However, all these ‘barriers’ could merely be betraying a hidden resistance 
to the appointment of the NC. Moreover, such reasons are hard to justify given the public interest 
nature of the listed companies involved. 
 
Should More Attention Be Given to the Nomination Committee? 
The NC does not receive the attention and guidance it requires for its effective functioning (KPMG, 
2012; EY and ICSA, 2016). In particular, there is a general lack of insistence on its appointment 
(Higgs, 2003; Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012). As indicated by the interviewees’ responses, the 
NC deserves the same amount of attention and guidance. This is because, as explained by such 
interviewees and in accordance with EY and ICSA (2016), the roles of the NC are crucial ones and 
therefore the NC requires more guidance, especially  from the regulator. In this context, the need for 
such a committee to be made mandatory is heavily implied. 
 
Does the Nomination Committee Reduce Board Bias? 
One may agree with most interviewees who claimed that Board members seem generally biased when 
recommending new members, because they would rather recommend someone they are familiar with 
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and trust rather than someone they barely know. However, being composed of independent NEDs, the 
NC helps reduce bias by ensuring that the Board nominees are not recommended for illicit reasons. 
This is in line with the findings of Vafeas (1999), Petra (2005) and Masulis (2012), which indicate that 
having a NC will benefit from better screening of the director candidates, potentially diminishing the 
bias in director appointments and working towards the effective functioning of the Board. 
 
Can the Board Replace the Nomination Committee? 
A further controversy lies in whether the Board can replace the NC. It is true that the Board can in 
theory perform all roles delegated to the NC, as well as those assigned to any other  BC. However, in 
practice, the question arises as to whether the Board is in a position to carry out such roles effectively. 
In line with Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998), most of the key decisions are primarily 
derived from BCs. As pointed out by some interviewees, without such committees, there would 
definitely be less room for proper discussions and examinations, as well as possibly the need to hold 
numerous meetings. This was confirmed  by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), who claimed that an 
effective NC enhances the Board’s  ability to discharge its roles more effectively. 
 
Does the Nomination Committee Enhance Corporate Governance? 
The NC plays a crucial role in ensuring that the most suitable directors are appointed. As stated by 
Higgs (2003), Murphy (2008) and KPMG (2012), this has a significant impact on the quality of CG in 
the company. Furthermore, results clearly indicated that interviewees with a NC in place disagreed 
significantly more (p<0.01) than those without such a NC with the claim that, in practice, the 
increased use of the NC would hardly raise the standards of CG. This indicates that the practical 
experience of having a NC is one of positive enhancement and of changing preconceptions. 
 
How Can the Nomination Committee Be Effective in Malta? 
In accordance with Petra (2005) and Masulis (2012), as well as with the NC-including interviewees’ 
responses, having an NC leads to the nomination of the most suitable and independent  candidates.  
This  is  because  key  matters  will  have  already  been    discussed primarily at a committee level, in 
this manner deploying more focus and time for effective discussion, and resulting in a more formal 
and transparent nomination process. This indicates that the company interviewees with hands-on 
experience within the NC perceived the appointment of such a committee to be good CG practice. 
This also indicates that the perception of NC-excluding interviewees who commented that the NC is 
not effective in Malta stems from their lack of experience on such a committee. 
 
Overall, most interviewees repeatedly maintained that in order for the NC to be effective in a small 
state like Malta, it would need to be composed of outside consultants rather than Board members. 
Indeed, as a tiny island Malta has “close interweaving personal relationships” (Magri and 
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Baldacchino, 2004, p.956). As a result, the pool of independent NEDs is limited and, being composed 
of Board members, the NC may lead to potential conflicts of interest, as was also indicated by a 
number of interviewees. This also aligns with the findings of KPMG (2012), EY and ICSA (2016), 
which also suggest that having the NC composed of Board members may result in a lack of scepticism 
and objectivity on the part of its members. Within this context, while, as has already been referred to, 
there is a need for such a role for outside consultants, a NC composed of NEDs but supported by such 




This study revealed that at present, the NC is not well established within MLCs yet, both in terms of 
the regulatory framework and also in terms of the NC’s roles, status and effectiveness. 
 
With regard to the Maltese regulatory framework, it is somewhat lacking, particularly in view of the 
‘comply or explain’ provision of the Code. In addition to rendering such Code mandatory in the 
Listing Rules, the need arises for the regulator to issue more specific guidance to not only ensure that 
the NC is appointed in all listed companies, but that more significance is attached to it by those 
companies which already have a NC. Furthermore, better regulatory provisions relating to the 
engagement of new directors are called for, particularly to compensate for the potential or actual 
biased influence of existing Board members. 
 
As regards the roles of the NC as already listed in the Code, they are in themselves sufficient. 
However, most NCs are not performing all of these roles. In particular, there seems to be a persistently 
strong resistance against the NC’s role of evaluating Board performance. In addition, even those roles 
currently performed by the committee may need to be carried out in a more structured manner if they 
are to be improved. 
 
The status of the NC within MLCs needs further clarification. Examples of this relate to whether the 
said committee should stand alone or be combined; whether there should be common membership 
between committees; whether it is recommendable for the chairman of the Board to be the NC 
chairman; what qualities, such as experience and qualifications, NC members are to be expected to 
have; and what constitutes an appropriate NC report. Such clarifications should go a long way to 
ensure that the NC receives the status it properly deserves. 
 
Finally, our findings show that, with regard to the effectiveness of the NC in the CG of  MLCs, 
companies that have such a committee find it somewhat effective. Nonetheless, the NC reduces Board 
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bias and enhances CG if it is composed of external consultants. Therefore,in order for the NC to be 
effective in Malta, it needs to be supported by independent outside consultants. 
The results of this study are subject to the following limitations. In spite of the efforts exerted to 
render the interview questions as clear as possible, the possibility of interviewee misunderstandings 
could not be fully eliminated. Furthermore, at times where comments on individual MLCs were 
requested, company interviewees refrained from giving specific information. This might have 
prevented the researchers from arriving at a complete picture of the overall situation of the NC in 
MLCs. Finally, although efforts were also made by the researchers to avoid bias and impartiality, the 
possibility of the presence of such factors cannot be discounted, particularly in view of the probing 
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